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The Federal Communication Commission's New
Enforcement Policy, Which Penalizes Broadcasters
for Airing Even a "Fleeting Expletive" in Violation
of the Statutory Indecency Ban, Is Not Arbitrary
and Capricious Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-Ju~iCIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS-SCOPE OF JuDiciAL REVIEW-The
Supreme Court of the United States held that an independent
government agency, such as the FCC, must only show good reason
for changing its prior policy to be in compliance with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. The agency is not required to articulate
why the new policy is, in fact, a better choice than its prior policy.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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1. THE FACTS OF FCC v. Fox
An estimated 2.5 million children were tuned into Fox Televi-
sion's live broadcast of the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when
singer Cher uttered, "I've had unbelievable support in my life and
I've worked really hard. . .. I've also had critics for the last 40
years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So fuck
'em."1 Just one year later, during the 2003 broadcast of the Bill-
board Music Awards, minor viewers were again exposed to the
foul language of reality television star Nicole Richie, when she
exclaimed, "Why do they even call it 'The Simple Life?' Have you
ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It's not so fucking
simple."12 The present case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. ,3
stems from these two broadcasts, which the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) has classified as "actionably indecent"
under a federal statute banning the broadcast of "any obscene,
indecent, or profane language" (hereinafter Indecency Ban).4
1. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13323 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order].
2. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13303.
3. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
4. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809. The statute reads, "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). Through this sta-
tute, Congress also delegated power to the FCC to "promulgate regulations for the enforce-
ment" of the Indecency Ban. Id. (Obscene Language; Promulgation of Regulations); see also
47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
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11. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FCC v. Fox
Although the Notice of Apparent Liability *for Forfeiture (NAL) 5
issued against Fox Television Stations, Inc. in this case did not
penalize the broadcaster for violating the Indecency Ban, it solidi-
fied the fact that the FCC would no longer tolerate even isolated,
"fleeting expletives" uttered during live media broadcasts. 6 This
new policy, which was first established by the FCC's Golden Globe
Order in 2004,7 marked a drastic change from the once lenient
policy of the FCC.8 The change was so significant that it prompted
Fox and multiple other licensed broadcasting companies to peti-
tion the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for
judicial review of the NAL. 9 However, because no penalty was
enforced against Fox, and the parties had not yet challenged the
decision before the FCC, the case was voluntarily remanded for an
Agency decision.'10
5. A Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture is a decision issued by the FCC against
a person or entity that has violated the indecency ban and is potentially liable for a forfei-
ture penalty. Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html (last visited May 24, 2010). In order to impose such a
forfeiture penalty, which is "a monetary sanction paid to the United States Treasury," the
FCC must first issue a NAL against the violating person or entity. Id. A NAL contains the
following: (1) the FCC's preliminary findings as to why the person or entity has apparently
violated the Indecency Ban; and (2) the amount of the proposed forfeiture. Id.
6. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1809.
7. In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globe Or-
der]. The Golden Globe Order was issued after the live broadcast of the 2004 Golden Globe
Awards, when U2 singer Bono exclaimed, "This is really, really, f***king brilliant." Fox,
129 S. Ct. at 1807 (citing Golden Globe Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4976, i.4). The Golden Globe
Order declared the broadcast of Bono's fleeting expletive "actionably indecent" and, for the
first time, made clear that even the occasional, unplanned use of a non-literal expletive
could be punished as a violation of the Indecency Ban. Id. at 1808.
8. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1806-07. The FCC's initial approach to enforcing the indecency
ban required broadcasters to refrain from the "deliberate" and "repetitive occurrence" of
indecent words. Id. at 1806. The enforcement policy was later expanded to make a distinc-
tion between the "literal" and "non-literal" use of indecent words, only retaining the delibe-
rate and repetitious requirements for an expletive used in the non-literal sense. Id. at
1807. Before arriving at its latest policy (the issue of dispute in the present case), the
FCC's enforcement policy focused on the context in which the utterance was made and
generally found that expletives that were "passing or fleeting in nature .. , tended to weigh
against a finding of indecency." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
9. Id. at 1808.
10. Id.
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A. The Second Circuit Reverses the FCCs Remand Order
In upholding its initial decision on remand, the FCC relied pri-
marily on the context in which the utterances occurred"' and
noted that both incidents would have been actionably indecent
under prior FCC policy.12 The FCC took the opportunity, however,
to clarify that the Golden Globe Order was the new policy of the
FCC and that fleeting expletives could be found actionably inde-
cent.'3
The FCC's Remand Order was then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and was ultimately reversed upon
a finding that the Agency's reasoning was insufficient under the
Administrative Procedure Act.14 The FCC then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari to
determine whether the FCC's new policy making fleeting exple-
tives actionably indecent was "arbitrary" or "capricious," thus jus-
tifying the Second Circuit's setting aside of the Agency decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act.'15
B. The Supreme Court Reverses the Second Circuit
1. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the
FCC's new enforcement policy was neither arbitrary nor capri-
11. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13305. "The program was designed to draw a large
nationwide audience that could be expected to include many children interested in seeing
their favorite music stars." Id.
12. Id. at 13307, 13324.
13. Id. at 13309. The FCC rationalized its decision by explaining:
We believe that granting an automatic exemption for "isolated or fleeting" expletives
unfairly forces viewers (including children) to take the "first blow." Indeed, it would
as a matter of logic permit broadcasters to air expletives at all hours of a day so long
as they did so one at a time.
Id.
14. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
15. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Second
Circuit was justified in reversing the FCC's new policy under the Administrative Procedure
Act. Id. The Administrative Procedure Act, in relevant part, states:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall de-
cide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The re-
viewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law ....
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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cious, and thus the judicial action taken by the Second Circuit was
improper. 16 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia criticized the
elevated standard of review employed by the Second Circuit,
which demanded greater explanation from the FCC simply be-
cause it was changing policy. 17 The majority found no support for
this interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and in-
stead concluded that an agency must only show good reason for a
change in policy. 18 The Court found this standard satisfied, as the
FCC's reasoning for expanding its enforcement policy was "entire-
ly rational." 19 That is to say the Court validated the following rea-
sons proffered by the FCC for changing its policy: (1) the new pol-
icy will protect the nation's children from offensive language; (2)
new technology makes it easier for broadcasters to bleep out a sin-
gle offensive word, and; (3) the FCC no longer read a prior Su-
preme Court decision as setting a constitutional bar against the
punishment of fleeting expletives and the new policy was not in-
consistent with this new reading.20
Justice Scalia then responded to the opposing views of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Respondent broadcasters,
and the Supreme Court dissenters, each in turn. 21 In addressing
the Second Circuit's reasoning for finding the FCC's action arbi-
trary and capricious, Justice Scalia pointed to three critical er-
rors.2 2 First, the empirical data that was demanded by the circuit
court to explain why the FCC had not previously banned fleeting
expletives was near impossible to obtain, and the government's
interest in protecting the nation's youth outweighed the need for
such data.23 Second, the circuit court's fear that the FCC's "first
blow" theory would require a ban on virtually all broadcasts of
16. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810. This case produced six separately written opinions: (1)
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, in which parts 1, 11, 111-A through 111-D, and
IV were joined by the Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito (only Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined with respect to Part III-E); (2) Jus-
tice Thomas filed a concurring opinion; (3) Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment; (4) Justice Stevens fied a dissenting opinion; (5)
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion; and (6) Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opi-
nion, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg all joined.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1812.
20. Golden Globe Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4978-82.
21. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1813- 19.
22. Id. at 1813- 14.
23. Id. at 1813. Justice Scalia described the Court of Appeals need for empirical data
as "insistfing] upon obtaining the unobtainable." Id. "Here it suffices to know that children
mimic the behavior they observe . ... Programming replete with one-word expletives will
tend to produce children who use (at least) one word indecent expletives." Id.
CC v. F x 7 3
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expletives, was not relevant to the policy being reviewed and ig-
nored the FCC's decision to review each incident on a case-by-case
basis.2 4 Third, the majority found unpersuasive the Second Cir-
cuit's argument against the FCC's prediction that an exemption
for fleeting expletives would lead to increased use.25
Next, the Court deemed it necessary to address some of the ar-
guments made by the Respondent broadcasters, but not adopted
by the Court of Appeals. 26 First, the argument that the FCC did
not acknowledge the change in policy was without merit, accord-
ing to the Court, as the Remand Order, which sets forth the new
policy, explicitly stated that all prior policies are "no longer good
law."27 Next, the Court determined that the second argument
pushed by the broadcasters, that the FCC had adopted a "pre-
sumption of indecency," ignored the FCC's continual emphasis on
context in determining whether or not a fleeting expletive is ac-
tionably indecent. 28 Finally, the Court interpreted the broadcas-
ters' reading of the Supreme Court's prior decision in FCC v. Paci-
fica Foundation29 to be inaccurate. 30
With the Court divided by only one vote, five of the fourteen
pages of Justice Scalia's opinion were dedicated to addressing the
opposing views of the dissenters. 3' Justice Scalia first disagreed
with Justice Breyer's claim that the FCC, as an independent
24. Id. at 1814.
25. Id. Justice Scalia noted, "To predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives
... will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives seems to us an exercise in logic
rather than clairvoyance." Id.
26. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1814- 15.
27. Id. at 1814 (citing Golden Globe Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980). The FCC's Remand
Order also reiterated this point: "Commission dicta and Bureau-level decisions issued
before [the Golden Globe Order] had suggested that expletives had to be repeated to be
indecent but. ... this guidance was seriously flawed." Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13300
(emphasis added).
28. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1815.
29. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica the Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld the
FCC's enforcement of the Indecency Ban against a radio station for airing comedian George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue and concluded that the FCC could punish broadcasters
for airing the seven indecent words actually used by Carlin. Id. The Court emphasized,
however, that it had not decided that an "occasional expletive ... would justify any sanc-
tion." Id. at 750. It was this statement from the Supreme Court in 1978 that provided
support for the FCC's policy against punishment for "fleeting expletives" for nearly forty
years. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1833 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1815. Though Fox would like to treat Pacifica as setting the
"outer limits of permissible regulation" that is not what the case stands for, and there is
presently no authority that prohibits an agency from gradually expanding its enforcement
policies. Id.
31. Id. at 1815-1819. While there was a majority with respect to all other Parts of
Justice Scalia's opinion, the portion addressing the arguments of the dissenters, Part III-E,
represented only a plurality of the Court.
agency, should be protected from political oversight. 32 Justice Sca-
lia explained that independent agencies are protected from presi-
dential oversight and not politics, and as a result there is more
pressure from Congress on the agencies. 33 Here, Justice Scalia
cited a House of Representatives Subcommittee hearing to suggest
that the FCC's new enforcement policy was actually urged by
Congress. 34 Justice Scalia also attacked Justice Breyer's argu-
ment that the FCC's new policy will have a detrimental impact on
small local broadcasters who cannot afford the expensive technol-
ogical equipment that would be necessary to "bleep out" fleeting
expletives and stay in compliance with FCC regulations. 35 Again,
however, Justice Scalia reiterated that the FCC has retained dis-
cretion to decide each incident on a case-by-case basis, and thus
the FCC would likely take the plight of the small local broadcaster
into consideration when deciding whether to impose sanctions for
an actionably indecent broadcast.36
Justice Scalia then addressed what he believed to be the flawed
reasoning behind Justice Stevens's dissent, which characterized
the relationship between the FCC and Congress as that of a prin-
cipal and agent.37 Because of this relationship, Justice Stevens
believed that the FCC owed Congress a greater explanation for its
change in policy. 38 The majority, however, disagreed.39
Finally, addressing an argument common to both Justice Breyer
and Justice Stevens, the majority found that the FCC's failure to
discuss the constitutional implications of its new policy did not
justify an "arbitrary" or "capricious" finding.40 According to the
majority, this argument ignored the attention paid to this issue in
32. Id. at 1815-16.
33. Id. at 1815.
34. Id. at 1816, n.4 (citing "Can You Say that on TVV": An Examination of the FCCs
Enforcement with respect to Broadcast Indecency, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 2-
4, 17, 19 (2004)). To make his point, Justice Scalia referenced a Subcommittee Hearing on
the FCC's enforcement of the Indecency Ban, in which several Representatives expressed
disapproval in the prior policy and the need for stricter enforcement. Id.
35. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1818.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1816. Quoting Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia explained, "In his judgment,
the FCC is 'better viewed as an agent of Congress' than as part of the Executive." Id.
38. Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1816. "[l]t seems to [the Court] that Justice Stevens' conclusion does not
follow from his premise. If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would seem an ade-
quate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes for stricter
enforcement." Id.
40. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1817.
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the FCC's Remand Order 4 1 and the fact that the Court had never
laid down a constitutional standard by which the FCC must ab-
ide .4 1
Before concluding, the Court discussed the constitutional chal-
lenge raised by Fox in this case, but declined to address the ques-
tion of whether the FCC's new policy violates the First Amend-
ment rights of licensed broadcasters, since it was not decided by
the Court of Appeals below .4 3 While recognizing that there would
likely be First Amendment implications, Justice Scalia believed it
will only be a matter of time before the issue was properly before
the Court and could be addressed at that time .44
2. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Writing separately from the majority, but concurring in the de-
cision, Justice Thomas expressed concern over the FCC's reliance
on two prior Supreme Court cases, Red Lion and Pacifica .4 5  Jus-
tice Thomas argued that the flaw with these two cases is that they
considered the constitutionality of FCC enforcement action in light
of the type of broadcast medium (broadcast or cable) at issue-a
distinction that is not found in the First Amendment .4 6  Such jus-
tification, Justice Thomas believed, is unsound for two reasons:
(1) it is unsupported by the text of the Constitution; and (2) mod-
ern technological advances have eliminated the need to make the
"factual assumptions" necessary to those decisions .4 7
41. Id. Justice Scalia stressed the fact that the FCC's Remand Order "devote[d] four
full pages of small-type, single-spaced text (over 1,300 words not counting footnotes) to
explaining why the Commission believes that its indecency -enforcement regime (which
includes its change in policy) is consistent with the First Amendment ... Id.
42. Id. The majority explained that the dissenters' view of Pacifica as drawing a "con-
stitutional line" was erroneous, and there is no rule prohibiting the FCC from adopting a
"more restrictive rule" without an in depth -explanation for the change. Id. at 1817-18.
43. Id. at 1819.
44. Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained: 'This Court ... is one of
final review, not of first review. . .. We see no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a
rush to judgment without a lower court opinion." Id. (internal citation omitted).
45. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas questioned the
use of Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Pacifica to support the FCC's
"1assertion of constitutional authority." Id. "Red Lion and Pacifica were unconvincing when
they were issued, and the passage of time has only increased doubt regarding their contin-
ued validity." Id.
46. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1821. Justice Thomas explained, 'The justifications relied on ..
in Red Lion and Pacifica--'spectrum scarcity, intrusiveness, and accessibility to children-
neither distinguish broadcast from cable, nor explain the relaxed application of the prin-
ciples of the First Amendment to broadcast." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
47. Id. at 1820-21. The "factual assumptions" identified by Justice Thomas included,
inter alia, broadcast scarcity and pervasiveness. Id. at 1821-22.
706 Vol. 48
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, wrote separately to express his disagreement with the
standard articulated by the majority-only requiring the FCC to
show good reason for departing from prior policy. 4 8 On this point,
Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissenters, in that the FCC must
provide a more detailed explanation when changing its policy. 4 9
Recognizing, however, that the prior FCC enforcement policy was
based on the 1978 Pacifica decision, and since the FCC acknowl-
edged that its reading of Pacifica had changed, Justice Kennedy
believed that the elevated standard was met. 50
4. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out two critical er-
rors that he believed were present in the majority's reasoning. 51
First, he disagreed with the majority's view that the FCC need not
provide greater explanation when departing from prior policy. 52
Justice Stevens supported the need for greater explanation by
comparing the FCC-Congress relationship with that of an agent-
principal.53 Justice Stevens reasoned that because the FCC's
power to enforce the Indecency Ban was derived from Congress,
its decisions reflect the views of the legislature, and thus a greater
explanation was owed.54 Second, Justice Stevens believed that the
majority erred in reading Pacifica as supporting the new FCC pol-
icy making even fleeting expletives punishable.55 Justice Stevens
explained that Pacifica did not hold that any word with sexual or
excretory origin could be found actionably indecent, and that "cus-
toms of speech" must be considered when determining indecency. 56
48. Id. at 1822-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1822.
50. Id. at 1824. Justice Kennedy explained that the reasoning offered by the FCC was
"quite sufficient" to uphold its change in policy and avoid an "arbitrary"~ or "capricious"
finding under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
51. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1824-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1825.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1826.
55. Id. at 1826-27.
56. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens gave the following
example:
As any golfer who has watched his partner shank a short approach knows, it would
be absurd to accept the suggestion that the resultant four-letter word uttered on the
golf course describes sex or excrement and is therefore indecent. But that is the ab-
surdity the FCC has embraced in its new approach to indecency.
Summer 2010 FCC v. Fox 707
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For these reasons, Justice Stevens would have found the new poli-
cy arbitrary and capricious, and subject to a judicial set-aside un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act.57
5. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
A second dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg focused exclusive-
ly on the majority's refusal to consider the First Amendment chal-
lenge urged by the broadcasting companies. 58 Justice Ginsburg
explained that this case dealt with a restriction placed upon
speech by the government, and the expletives at issue in this case
are often used simply as intensifiers or as a means of expressing
emotion.59 Justice Ginsburg warned that this type of restriction
on what has become ''commonplace'' speech must be made with
caution to avoid infringement of constitutional guarantees. 60
6. Justice Breyer's Dissent
The final dissent of the case, written by Justice Breyer and
joined by the other three dissenting justices, again emphasized the
need for a more satisfactory explanation from the FCC as to why it
chose to deviate from its prior policy. 61 Justice Breyer noted that
the three reasons set forth by the FCC for its new course were in-
sufficient in light of its failure to address two matters of critical
Id. at 1827.
57. Id. at 1828.
58. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg explained that she agreed with the
reasoning in Justice Breyer's dissent, but wrote separately "only to note that there is no
way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has
done [and] today's decision does nothing to diminish that shadow." Id.
59. Id. Justice Ginsburg cited the famous First Amendment case of Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), to make this point. Id.; See Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the FRrst
Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty. 65 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 119, 173 n.216 (1991)
(affirming that Cohen is a "well-known opinion"). In that case, a man wearing a "Fuck the
Draft" t-shirt in public challenged his conviction for disturbing the peace, and the Court
held that "the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
make the simple public display -... of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
60. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1829 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer rationalized the need for greater
explanation by way of the following example:
An (imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving
on the right-side, rather than the left-side, of the road might say, "Well, one side
seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a coin." But even assuming the rationality
of that explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if of-
fered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right-side to
left-side, 25 years later.
Id. at 1830-31.
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importance. 62 The two omissions that led the four dissenting jus-
tices to conclude that the FCC's new policy was "arbitrary" and
"4capricious"~ under the Administrative Procedure Act included: (1)
the failure to explain how the new policy was consistent with the
constitutional line drawn in Pacifica,63 and (2) how the new policy
would impact local broadcasting coverage.64
As to the inconsistency with the Pacifica decision, Justice Brey-
er recalled that the initial FCC enforcement policy was tailored to
match the narrow language endorsed by the Court-deliberate
and repetitive use of expletives. 65 The FCC's only explanation for
its departure from its previous understanding of Pacifica was that
the Court's opinion failed to address the question of whether a
fleeting expletive could be actionably indecent, and this left the
door open for stricter enforcement of the Indecency Ban, without
crossing the constitutional line.6 6
The second omission from the FCC's rationale that Justice
Breyer identified as casting doubt among the dissenters was the
FCC's failure to consider the effect that the new policy would have
on local broadcasting.67 Justice Breyer explained that all the FCC
had to do was consider how the new policy would impact live, local
broadcasting coverage by small companies that could not afford
the expensive "bleeping out" technology.68 The FCC received nu-
merous complaints over this issue, and Justice Breyer suggested
that if had it used its traditional "administrative notice-and-
comment procedures," this critical omission would not be an is-
sue.69
62. Id. at 1829.
63. Id. at 1833.
64. Id. at 1835.
65. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1833 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1834. According to Justice Breyer, the FCC's only attempt to explain its
departure from Pacifica was through twenty-eight words found in the agency's Remand
Order (only noting that the Court did not address the issue). Id. The dissenters were unsa-
tisfied with this explanation, as it failed to adequately answer why its reading of the case
had drastically changed. Id.
67. Id. at 1835.
68. Id. Referencing an amici curiae brief, Justice Breyer noted that "the costs of bleep-
ing/delay systems, up to $100,000 for installation and annual operation, place that technol-
ogy beyond the financial reach of many smaller independent local stations." Id. at 1835.36
(citing Brief for Amici Curiae Former FCC Commissioners and Officials in Support of Res-
pondents at 14, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582)).
69. Id. at 1837. The traditional "notice and comment rulemaking procedure" requires
the FCC to respond to all significant comments raised by the public before enacting a new
policy. Id. By following this procedure and responding to all public concerns, the FCC may
have developed a more rational explanation for its change in policy, which the dissenters
believed was required under the Administrative Procedure Act to avoid being "arbitrary or
CC v. F x 7 9
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Finally, Justice Breyer addressed the majority's decision to re-
serve the First Amendment challenges raised in this case. 70 Here,
Justice Breyer also disagreed with the majority and would have
remanded this issue for reconsideration, rather than completely
strike it down as the majority did.71 Taking all of these factors
together, the dissenting Justices concluded that the FCC's new
policy was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, and a remand to the FCC would be the proper course
of action.72
111. How THE FCC's ENFORCEMENT POLICY HAs "GRADUALLY
EXPANDED" OVER TIME
Since 1960, when Congress first granted the FCC power to en-
force the statutory Indecency Ban, the agency has taken a gradu-
ally expanding approach to stricter enforcement. 73 Prior to arriv-
ing at its current policy, which makes even fleeting expletives ac-
tionably indecent, 74 the FCC made clear that a broadcaster was
unlikely to be penalized for airing only an occasional expletive.75
The new policy of the FCC, however, marked such a drastic
change from prior enforcement policies that the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and four Supreme Court Justices believed it was
'' arbitrary and capricious"~ and should have been set aside under
the Administrative Procedure Act.76
capricious." See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that the traditional rulemaking procedure would be futile if agencies were not
required to consider and respond to all significant public concerns).
70. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1841.
73. Fox, 489 F.3d at 447.
74. Golden Globe Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980.
75. In re Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) [hereinafter
Policy Statement]. The FCC asserted, "[Wihere sexual or excretory references have been
made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this characteristic has tended to
weigh against a finding of indecency." Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8008 (emphasis
added).
76. Fox, 489 F.3d at 447; Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1841 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. 1975-1 98 7: Strict Adherence to the Supreme Court's Holding
in Pacifica
The first exercise of the FCC's enforcement power was in 1975
against a radio station owned by the Pacifica Foundation. 77 By
way of a declarative order, the FCC deemed Pacifica's daytime
broadcast of comedian George Carlin's prerecorded "Filthy Words"
monologue actionably indecent. 78 The FCC's order, which was
challenged all the way to the Supreme Court, defined "indecency"
in terms of patent offensiveness and laid the foundation for the
agency's initial enforcement policy, which required deliberate and
repetitive use of an expletive to be considered actionably inde-
cent.79
In Pacifica the Supreme Court responded to the challenge
against the FCC's definition of indecency and determined whether
the FCC, in fact, had the power to regulate the broadcast of lan-
guage that was indecent, but not obscene. 80 Relying on the plain
language of the Indecency Ban, a narrowly divided Court upheld
the FCC's indecency definition and found that the daytime broad-
cast of "Filthy Words" was actionably indecent.81 The Court
adopted the FCC's reasoning that enforcement of the Indecency
Ban should be regarded in the same way as the tort of nuisance,
taking into consideration the context, i.e. time, content of pro-
gram, and broadcast medium, in which the indecent statement
was made.82 Though Pacifica was not penalized for its indecent
broadcast, the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the FCC's order
put broadcasters on notice that they could be penalized for similar
broadcasts in the future.83
77. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d
94 (1975) [hereinafter Citizen's Complaint].
78. Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94. In the monologue Carlin identified seven
offensive words that should not be said in public, and then continued to repeat them
throughout the broadcast. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751 (Appendix to Opinion of the
Court) (reproducing the text of the actionably indecent broadcast).
79. Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The FCC defined "indecency" as "language
that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Id.
80. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
81. Id. at 750-51.
82. Id. at 750. Justice Stevens explained, '"[N]uisance may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of a barnyard.' . . . [Wihen the [FCC] finds
that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on
proof that the pig is obscene." Id. at 750-51 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926)).
83. Id. at 730.
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In the years following the Pacifica decision, the FCC made clear
that it would strictly adhere to the narrowness of the Supreme
Court's holding in exercising its enforcement power. 84 In 1978 the
FCC issued an agency decision, In re Application of WGBH Educa-
tional Foundation, granting a license renewal to WGBH-TV over
an objection that the station continually violated the Indecency
Ban by broadcasting material, such as nudity and profanity, that
was harmful to children.85 In its Memorandum Opinion, the FCC
explained that its enforcement power was limited to the seven
words actually found indecent in Pacifica and, even then, the oc-
casional, non-deliberate broadcast of such words was beyond the
reach of the FCC.8 6
B. 1 98 7-2001: A Period of Slight Expansion
It was not until 1987 when the FCC again invoked its enforce-
ment power and declared a broadcast actionably indecent-this
time under a revised standard. 87 In In re Infinity Broadcasting
Corp. of Pa., which consolidated three challenged rulings, the FCC
disavowed its strict adherence to the Pacifica holding and ex-
panded its enforcement policy to cover indecent words not actually
contained in the "Filthy Words" monologue. 88 The FCC blamed
the absence of any actionably indecent findings in the twelve years
following Pacifica on the unfounded belief that the broadcast had
to closely resemble that of the George Carlin monologue. 89
In one of the challenged rulings upheld by Infinity, the FCC also
dropped its deliberate and repetitive use requirements when an
expletive is expressed in the literal sense, i.e., it relates to sexual
or excretory activities or organs. 90 Recognizing that expletives are
84. See In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978). The
FCC clarified that it "intend[ed] to strictly observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding
[which] stated that [the Court) was not ruling that 'an occasional expletive . .. would justify
any sanction."' WGBH, 69 F.C.C.2d at 1254.
85. Id. at 1250.
86. Id. at 1254.
87. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987).
88. Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930. The case consolidated the following three challenged
FCC rulings: (1) In re Infinity, 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987), (2) In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2
F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987), and (3) In re the Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987).
89. Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930. "Unstated, but widely assumed ... was the belief that
only material that closely resembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy the inde-
cency test articulated by the FCC in 1975." Id.
90. Pacifica, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699. "We take this opportunity to state that, notwithstand-
ing any prior contrary indications, we will not apply the Pacifica standard so narrowly in
the future." Id. "While speech that is indecent must involve more than an isolated use of
an offensive word, repetitive use .. , is not an absolute requirement." Id. (emphasis added).
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often used in their non-literal sense as intensifiers or to express
emotion, the FCC determined that the once mandatory deliberate
and repetitive use requirements only applied to the broadcast of
non-literal expletives. 91 These expanded enforcement standards
encompassed in Infinity were later upheld by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.92
In 1989 the Supreme Court again reviewed an action by the
FCC, this one declaring Sable Communication's "dial-a-porn" tele-
phone service indecent under the Communications Act of 1934.93
The Court revisited its prior decision in Pacifica to ascertain the
appropriate standard for an indecency finding.94 The Court, how-
ever, found that the ban at issue in Sable, which amounted to an
outright prohibition against indecent interstate commercial tele-
phone communication, was unconstitutional as it limited the con-
tent of private adult telephone conversations. 9 5 Writing for the
majority, Justice White carefully distinguished the ban involved in
Sable from that involved in Pacifica by noting that the latter did
not involve an absolute ban against the broadcast of any indecent
language, whereas the ban at issue in Sable involved a total ban
against indecent telephone communications. 96
Throughout the 1990s the FCC's indecency policy remained
substantially unaltered.97 The FCC retained its lilteraIlnon-literal
distinction, only requiring deliberate and repetitive use for a non-
literal expletive. 98 As a result of the stricter enforcement policy,
the FCC issued a total of thirty-four NALs against broadcasters
for violating the Indecency Ban from 1993 to 2000.99
91. Id.
92. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
,hereinafter Act D1, superseded in part by Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
93. Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118 (1989). The specific statutory
provision at issue in Sable was 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
94. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
95. Id. at 131.
96. Id. at 127 ("Pacifica is readily distinguishable ... most obviously because it did not
involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent material."). The Court further explained its
holding in Sable by noting that "the government may not 'reduce the adult population ..
to . .. only what is fit for children."' Id. at 128 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383 (1957)).
97. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.
98. Id.
99. Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993 - 2006,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/CompStatChart.pdf (last visited May 24, 2010).
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C. 2001-2004: The FCC's Policy Statement Asserts that "Fleeting
Expletives" Should Not be Actionably Indecent
In 2001 the FCC clarified its enforcement policy when it issued
an official Policy Statement. 100 Through its Policy Statement the
FCC explained that indecency determinations required the follow-
ing two conditions to be satisfied: (1) the alleged indecent lan-
guage must be made in the literal sense, i.e., describe or depict
sexual or excretory organs or activities; and (2) the broadcast must
be patently offensive as measured by community standards for the
broadcast medium. 101 The Policy Statement also emphasized the
need to consider the full context of the alleged indecent broadcast
before making an indecency determination and noted that no sin-
gle factor is dispositive. 102 For the first time, however, the FCC
expressed that as a general rule a fleeting expletive should not be
deemed actionably indecent. 103
D. 2004-Present: The FCC's Golden Globe Order Declares "Fleet-
ing Expletives"Actionably Indecent
The view expressed in the FCC's 2001 Policy Statement did not
survive long, however, as the FCC officially declared in its 2004
Golden Globe Order that even a fleeting expletive could be deemed
actionably indecent. 104  The Golden Globe Order was issued
against the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") for airing
the "F-word" during a live broadcast of the Golden Globe
Awards. 105 Though it was argued that the "F-word" was not used
in its literal sense and failed to meet the deliberate and repetitive
requirements maintained for such non-literal expletives, the FCC
nonetheless found NBC's broadcast indecent. 106 The FCC articu-
lated the primary reasons for its change in policy as being the pro-
tection of the nation's children, the availability of new technology
making it possible to bleep out a single offensive word, and a dif-
100. Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999.
101. Id. at 8002.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8008-09.
104. Golden Globe Order, 19 F.c.C.R. at 4980. See supra text accompanying note 7 for
an explanation of the incident leading to the FCC's new policy set forth in the Golden Globe
Order.
105. Id. at 4975-76.
106. Id. at 4979. The FCC explained that it rejected the broadcaster's argument that
the "F-word" was used only as an intensifier, because "given the core meaning of the 'F-
Word,' any use of that word . .. inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls
within the first prong of our indecency definition." Id. at 4978.
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ferent reading of the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision.107 It is
this new policy of the Golden Globe Order that was challenged in
FCC v. Fox as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 108
I-V. How THE SUPREME COURT HAS INTERPRETED THE SCOPE OF
REVIEW FOR AGENCY DECISIONS UNDJER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
A major point of disagreement among the majority in FCC v.
Fox and the Court's dissenters, as well as the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, was the appropriate standard under which the
FCC's policy change should be judged. 109 Case law in this area can
be traced all the way back to the 16th century, when the English
Common Pleas court handed down its decision in Rooke's Case in
1598, a case relied on by Justice Stevens in his dissent. 10 In
Rooke's Case, the court was asked to determine the scope of a sew-
er commission's discretion in issuing a decision to drain the Eng-
lish fens.' Writing for the court, Justice Coke set forth the no-
tion that agencies are not permitted to act arbitrarily according to
their own discretion, but rather they must justify their actions
through reason.112
In construing the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows
courts to set aside agency decisions that are arbitrary and capri-
cious, 1 13 American courts also seemed to follow the early English
107. Id. at 4978-82. "[O1ur decision is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court ruling in
Pacifica. The Court explicitly left open the issue of whether an occasional expletive could
be considered indecent." Id. at 4982 (footnote omitted).
108. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1804-05.
109. Id. at 1810-11. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained, "Mhe agency
must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a
court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy arc better than the reasons for the
old one." Id. at 1811; but see contra Id. at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The standard]
requires the agency here to focus upon the reasons that led the agency to adopt the initial
policy, and to explain why it comes to a new judgment"); Fox, 489 F.3d at 456 ("Agencies
are of course free to revise their rules and policies. Such a change, however, must provide a
reasoned analysis for departing from prior precedent").
110. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rooke's Case, (1598) 77 Eng.
Rep. 209, 2 10 (C.P.)).
111. Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep, at 210. A "fen" is "a low peaty land covered wholly or
partly with water."WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INVL DICTIONARY 837 (1986).
112. Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 210. The early English judge explained:
"[INotwithstanding the words of the commission giv[ing] authority to the commissioners to
do according to their discretions -... their proceedings ought to he limited and hound with
the rule of reason and law. .. and not to do according to their wills and private affections."
Id. at 211.
113. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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notion that agencies must provide reasoning for their policy deci-
sions.114 The following two cases highlight this point, as they in-
volve the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of review
under the Administrative Procedure Act and the depth of reason-
ing agencies must provide to avoid having their policies set aside
as "arbitrary or capricious."
A. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (1971)
In 1971 the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the
Department of Transportation's spending of federal funds for the
construction of a six-lane highway through a public park was a
valid exercise of agency authority in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe."'5 Those challenging the Department of
Transportation's authority argued that the agency simply relied
on the judgment of the local city council, without making indepen-
dent factual determinations as to the availability of alternative
routes or design changes that would decrease the impact on the
public park."16 This failure was claimed to be a violation of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,117 and the Court was asked to
review the agency's decision."18 Because the Court was presented
with an incomplete record, it could not decide the outcome of the
case, but it did consider the appropriate scope of review for agency
decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act."19 The Court
expressed that such review is narrow, and that a reviewing court
should be satisfied if the agency shows that it considered relevant
factors in reaching its decision.'12 0
114. See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86
(1974) ("[W~e will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may rea-
sonably be discerned"); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)
(stating that an agency must convey a "~rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made").
115. 401 U.S. 402 (1971) abrogated by califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) (hold-
ing that the Administrative Procedure Act is not an independent grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
116. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 408.
117. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964) (current version at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2006)).
118. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 408.
119. Id. at 419-20. In declining to address the issues presented in Overton Park, the
Court explained, 'The lower courts based their review on the litigation affidavits that were
presented [but] they clearly do not constitute the 'whole record' compiled by the agency:
the basis for review required by § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act." Id.
120. Id. at 414. Justice Marshall explained that a reviewing court must "consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment. ... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id. at 416.
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B. State Farm (1983)
Another case relied on by both the majority and the Court's dis-
senters in FCC v. Fox was the 1983 State Farm case, with each
reading the case as setting forth a different standard for determin-
ing the validity of an agency decision that changes prior policy. 121
In State Farm, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
an order of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA"), rescinding the requirement that all newly manufac-
tured vehicles be equipped with either automatic seatbelts or air-
bags, was arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. 122 The NHTSA's rescission marked a drastic change
from its prior policy, which mandated the installation of such
crash protection devices. 123
In a narrowly divided 5-4 decision, the Court found that the or-
der of the NHTSA was arbitrary and capricious and thus subject
to being set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act.'12 4 The
Court explained that a change in policy is subject to the same test
as the adoption of the initial policy ("arbitrary or capricious"), but
that the NHTSA failed to provide adequate reasoning for its
change in course. 125 The Court found NHTSA's reasoning inade-
quate and unreasonable in several respects: (1) the agency gave
no consideration to modifying the standard, rather than rescind-
ing it; (2) NHTSA was "too quick" to dismiss the benefits of the
safety devices; (3) the data acquired from field tests was not indic-
ative of real world experiences; and (4) the agency failed to explain
why continuing the requirement would receive negative public
reaction. 126 Given these shortcomings in the NHTSA's order, the
Supreme Court chose to set aside the agency's elimination of the
121. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Writing for the majority in FCC v. Fox, Justice Scalia reasoned, "[State Farm], which in-
volved the rescission of a prior regulation, said only that such action requires 'a reasoned
analysis for a change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in
the first instance."' 129 S. Ct. at 1810 (emphasis added) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at
42). On the other hand, Justice Breyer read State Farm as requiring an agency "to focus
upon the reasons that led [it] to adopt the initial policy, and to explain why it now comes to
a new judgment." Id. at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 57.
125. Id. at 42. "[Amn agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance." Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 48-57.
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passive restraint requirement in new automobiles as arbitrary
and capricious. 127
The dissenters in State Farm took the opposite view, however,
finding that NHTSA's new policy, with respect to the detachable
seatbelts, was not arbitrary or capricious. 128 Justice Rehnquist,
writing in dissent, explained that an agency must only provide a
rational explanation when it changes policy. 129 Justice Rehnquist,
joined by three other justices, would have concluded that the
NHTSA met this standard and would have given greater defe-
rence to the agency's decision. 30
V. WHY THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FCC's
"FLEETING EXPLETIVE" POLICY AND) REVERSING THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
Given the varying interpretations of the Supreme Court's prior
cases dealing with the Administrative Procedure Act's scope of
judicial review, it is fairly easy to see why the Court in FCC v. Fox
was so narrowly divided. This case, however, settled once and for
all the confusion surrounding the proper scope of judicial review
for agency decisions that effectuate a change in prior policy. Un-
der the majority's interpretation, an agency must only provide a
reasoned explanation for its change in policy to be in compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act.131 According to Justice
Scalia and the majority, the FCC met this standard, as it "ade-
quately" explained its reasons for departing from prior policy and
making fleeting expletives actionably indecent. 132
A. Inconsistency with State Farm
Justice Scalia's opinion in FCC v. Fox seemed to echo the words
of Justice Rehnquist who, along with three other justices, dis-
127. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57.
128. Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id.
130. Id. Justice Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell,
and Justice O'Connor. Id. at 57.
131. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811. Justice Scalia explained that an agency need not show
better reasons for its new policy, as "it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the
statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better." Id.
132. Id. at 1812. The majority concluded that the FCC "forthrightly acknowledged that
its recent actions have broken new ground" and "the agency's reasons for expanding the
scope of its enforcement activity were entirely rational." Id. Thus, the FCC's new enforce.
ment policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious under the standard adopted by the Court.
Id.
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sented in the 1983 State Farm case. In State Farm, Justice Rehn-
quist claimed that the NHTSA's broad and conclusory rejection of
an empirical study showing an increase in seatbelt usage in cars
equipped with automatic seatbelts was adequate reasoning for the
agency to drop the once mandatory automatic seatbelt require-
ment.133 The majority of the Court in State Farm disagreed with
Justice Rehnquist, however, and set aside the NHTSA's new poli-
cy for failing to provide a more reasoned explanation. 134
Oddly enough, Justice Scalia asserted that the decision in FCC
v. Fox was not inconsistent with any prior decisions of the
Court.1 35 How then can one reconcile the drastically different out-
comes between the present case and State Farm? In both situa-
tions, the agencies offered, at best, conclusory explanations for
their departure from prior policy, and yet opposite results were
achieved. Two judges on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
four Justices on the Supreme Court also struggled with this recon-
ciliation.136 While recognizing that State Farm does not impose a
"heightened standard" on courts reviewing an agency's policy
change, these legal scholars believed that the case stands for the
proposition that an agency must reasonably explain why it
changed its prior policy to be adequate, and, in their opinion, the
FCC failed to meet this standard. 137
133. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Rehnquist explained, 'The agency's obligation is to articulate a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made' . . . I believe it has met this stan-
dard." Id. at 59 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168).
134. Id. at 57 (majority opinion). The Court concluded, "an agency changing its course
must supply a reasoned analysis . . . [and] the agency has failed to supply the requisite
Ireasoned analysis' in this case." Id. (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)) (internal quotation omit-
ted).
135. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Scalia explained:
We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a re-
quirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act
mentions no such heightened standard. And our opinion in State Farm neither held
nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change must be justified
by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first in-
stance.
Id. at 1810.
136. Id. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Fox, 489 F.3d at 455.
137. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer, writing i dis-
sent, noted, the following questions must be answered: "Why does [the FCC] now reject the
considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy? What has changed in the world that
offers justification for the change? What other good reasons are there for departing from
the earlier policy?" Id.
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B. Response to Criticism
Prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of the FCC v. Fox case,
the Second Circuit's decision to set aside the FCC's fleeting exple-
tive policy was met with great criticism and a prediction that the
Supreme Court would ultimately reverse. 138 It was argued that
the Second Circuit impermissibly replaced the FCC's judgment
with its own and that the decision was inconsistent with prior
court rulings upholding earlier expansions of the FCC's enforce-
ment policy, even though far less explanation was offered for those
changes.139 Specifically, it was claimed that the FCC's decision in
1987 to expand its enforcement policy beyond the seven words ac-
tually contained in George Carlin's monologue was not an insigni-
ficant change, and yet the expansion was upheld by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Act 1.140 For this reason, critics argued that
the Second Circuit erred in striking down the FCC's fleeting ex-
pletive policy, as it was only a further expansion of the enforce-
ment policy and well-reasoned in light of prior expansions. 141
It is important to note, however, that it was then-Judge Gins-
burg who authored the District of Columbia Circuit Court's Act 1
opinion in 1988, upholding the initial expansion of the FCC's en-
forcement policy beyond George Carlin's seven "Filthy Words." 42
Ironically, Justice Ginsburg, now sitting on the Supreme Court,
was among the four dissenters in the present case who would have
judicially set aside the FCC's most recent "expansion"~ as arbitrary
and capricious. 43 There is only one possible explanation for Jus-
tice Ginsburg's discrepant treatment of the two expanded en-
forcement policies-the FCC's latest policy is not a mere "expan-
sion," but rather a 180-degree change in position. For the past
three decades, and most recently in the 2001 Policy Statement, the
FCC made clear that a fleeting expletive would not be considered
138. Justin winquist, Comment, Arbitrary and FA@#$*! Capricious: An Analysis of the
Second Circuit's Rejection of the FCCs Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC (2007), 57 Am. U. L. REV. 723 (2008); see also Andrew Smith, Note,
Out on a Limb without Direction: How the Second Circuit's Decision in Fox v. FCC Failed
to Adequately Address Broadcast Indecency and why the Supreme Court Must Correct the
Confusion, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 383 (2008).
139. Winquist, supra note 138, at 760.
140. Id. at 739. Wmnquist explained, "Given that the policy change in Act I was consi-
derably more expansive than the one at issue in Fox Television, the Fox Television court
should have given more deference to the FCC and should have found its explanation ade-
quate to defeat the arbitrary and capricious challenge." Id.
141. Id.
142. Act 1, 852 F.2d at 1332.
143. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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"actionably indecent," and that deliberateness and repetition were
requisites for such a finding.'"4 In the stroke of a pen, however,
the FCC's thirty year policy was overturned with little explana-
tion, which is why Justice Ginsburg and her fellow dissenters
reached the superior conclusion in FCC v. Fox.
C. Why the Dissenters in FCC v. Fox were Correct
As the dissenters in FCC v. Fox explained, common sense re-
quires a more rational explanation when an agency implements a
new policy that marks such a drastic change from its prior posi-
tion.145 When this is the case, it is not sufficient for an agency to
simply say, "We like the new policy better," as Justice Breyer sug-
gested the FCC did here.146 Although numerous explanations for
the FCC's change of course have been advanced by outside parties,
i.e., the change was urged by Congress, 47 the word "any" in the
Indecency Ban indicates that Congress did not intend a "safe har-
bor," 48 etc., the FCC failed to advance any such reasoning. Ra-
ther, the FCC supported the overturn of its thirty-year policy in
twenty-eight words, encompassing two sentences, as to why its
reading of Pacifica had changed.149
The only other theory advanced by the FCC in support of the
policy change was the idea that tolerating fleeting expletives un-
fairly forced viewers, especially children, to take the "first blow."'150
While the interest in protecting America's youth is great, the FCC
cannot lose sight of the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.
Although the Supreme Court declined to address the First
Amendment challenge in FCC v. Fox, it cannot be forgotten that
enforcement of the Indecency Ban should not have the effect of
limiting the content of the adult population to only that which is
suitable for children.' 5 ' As the Court has already suggested, such
enforcement would be "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig" and
144. Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8008.
145. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1841 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. winquist, supra note 138, at 748-51 (explaining that the FCC's new policy was
supported by both houses of Congress, which issued resolutions "urging the FCC to contin-
ue its policy of sanctioning indecent speech").
148. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Solicitor Gener-
al set forth an adequate explanation for the FCC's policy change, but the "fatal flaw" with
the explanation was that it was made by the Solicitor General, not the FCC).
149. Id. at 1834.
150. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309.
151. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131.
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unconstitutional. 52 So, while the majority was content with find-
ing the "first blow" theory as reason enough to uphold the FCC's
absolute ban against fleeting expletives under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the same result is unlikely under the looming con-
stitutional challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the controversial FCC v. Fox decision in light of
the history of the FCC's enforcement policy and the interpretation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that the Supreme
Court's decision was unsound for two reasons. First, the Court
may have correctly interpreted the scope of review for agency deci-
sions under the Administrative Procedure Act, but it improperly
applied that standard to the FCC's new fleeting expletive policy.
The FCC did not provide a reasoned explanation for the drastic
change of its thirty year policy, which was required under the ma-
jority's interpretation. 5 3 Second, the Court's refusal to address
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters only postponed the
inevitable constitutional challenge in FCC v. Fox. It is only a mat-
ter of time before the Supreme Court recognizes, as Justice Gins-
burg predicted, that there is no way to escape the 'long shadow
the First Amendment casts over what the [FCC] has done." 54 For
now, the broadcasting community can only patiently await the
release of the Second Circuit's opinion on remand to see how the
Supreme Court's opinion will be interpreted and what the Su-
preme Court will face when it revisits the constitutional issue in a
future term.155
Brittany A. Roof
152. Id. (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
153. Fox, i29 S.Ct.at 1811.
154. Id. at i828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. The Second Circuit heard oral re-argument in the Fox case on Jan. 13, 2010, but
has yet to issue a decision. John Eggerton, Second Circuit Schedules Oral Arguments In
Fox us. FCC for Jan 13, BENTON FOUNDATION, Dec. 18, 2009,
http://www.benton.org/node/30732.
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